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This article covers cases from the Survey period of June 28, 2001,
through December 11, 2002, that the author believed were noteworthy
because they added to the jurisprudence on the applicable subject. Be-
cause this Survey article is the first for this topic, the Survey period is
slightly longer than that of other articles. The author is indebted to
Jimmy Schnurr and Jason Marshal for their assistance with the review
of cases and drafting portions of this article.
I. ZONINGZONING and rezoning of land by Texas cities is governed by the
provisions of the Texas Zoning Enabling Act.' The few cases aris-
ing during the Survey period with respect to the validity of zoning
amendments follow the general rule that zoning ordinances are presumed
valid. 2 In City of San Antonio v. Arden Encino Partners, Ltd.,3 the City of
San Antonio zoned a 22-acre tract of land to a multi-family district. The
property was never developed. Fourteen years later, the council member
for the area proposed that the tract be zoned to an office district. Arden
Encino Partners ("AEP") argued in its summary judgment motion to in-
validate the downzoning on the ground that the City had no legitimate
public reason warranting a change in zoning, and the trial court granted
the landowner's motion.4
In reversing the trial court, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that
a broad range of governmental purposes will support a city's decision to
* B.B.A. Austin College, M.P.A., J.D., University of Texas School of Law; Attorney
at Law, Winstead Sechrest & Minick P.C., Dallas, Texas.
1. TEx. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 211.001-.021 (Vernon 1999).
2. See, e.g., City of Pharr v. Tippett, 616 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. 1981).
3. City of San Antonio v. Arden Encino Partners, Ltd., No. 04-01-00008-CV, 2003
WL 1090544 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Mar. 12, 2003, no pet. h.).
4. Id. at *1.
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zone land to a particular classification. 5 The City presented summary
judgment evidence that the rezoning would provide a buffer to adjacent
single-family developments and avoid three story residential structures
overlooking nearby family residences. Because AEP failed to meet its
burden to show there were no conclusive facts or conditions supporting
the City's exercise of its zoning authority, the court of appeals reversed
and remanded the case to the trial court.6
City of Laredo v. VillareaP involves the legislative construction of a
zoning ordinance that authorized the construction of a communications
tower. The Villareals constructed a tower without a required zoning per-
mit. They then sought and received a zoning permit with conditions al-
lowing only the existing tower to remain on the site. One of the
conditions to the zoning approval was that the permit was not
transferable. 8
The Villareals attempted to construct a new tower meeting the condi-
tions, but the city refused the application because of the non-transferabil-
ity condition. The plaintiffs argued that the first permit clearly
envisioned a second tower being built on the premises. As the adminis-
trative agency enforcing the ordinance, the City argued that its interpre-
tation was entitled to serious consideration. The trial court ruled in favor
of the Villareals, but the court of appeals found that the City's interpreta-
tion, limiting the first permit to the existing tower, was consistent with the
non-transferability condition and the overall intent to limit the tower
since it was built without permission and in violation of the zoning ordi-
nance. Because the City's construction of its ordinance was deemed rea-
sonable, the court of appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and
rendered judgment in favor of the City.9
II. BOARDS OF ADJUSTMENT
Numerous cases were reported during the Survey period regarding the
legal standard for reviewing the decisions of a board of adjustment or
similar administrative agency. The board hears appeals from decisions of
the city building inspector on interpretations of the city's zoning ordi-
nance. 10 An appeal from a board's decision is by certiorari on the record
to the district court. In a certiorari proceeding to review an order of a
city board of adjustment, "the only question which may be raised by peti-
tion is that of the legality of the board [of adjustment's] order."" "A
legal presumption exists in favor of the board, and the burden of proof to
establish illegality rests upon those who attempt to overcome the pre-
5. Id. at *2 (citing Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 934 (Tex. 1998)).
6. Id. at *3.
7. City of Laredo v. Villareal, 81 S.W.3d 865 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.).
8. Id. at 866-67.
9. Id. at 867-69.
10. TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 211.008 (Vernon 1999).
11. City of San Angelo v. Boheme Bakery, 190 S.W.2d 67, 70 (Tex. 1945).
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sumption of validity."12
Boards of adjustment often make determinations on nonconforming
uses. In Board of Adjustment of San Antonio v. Wende,13 the board
found that land leased but not used for quarrying purposes before being
annexed and subsequently zoned for residential use was a "preexisting
nonconforming use" as a quarry.' 4 The trial court upheld the board's
decision, but the San Antonio Court of Appeals reversed and rendered. 15
Martin Marietta leased a large tract of land for quarrying operations.
At the time of its annexation and zoning for residential purposes, a por-
tion of the quarry was actually being used for quarrying purposes and a
portion was planned for future quarrying operations. Martin Marietta
filed a registration statement of nonconforming use that was accepted by
the City Building Office. City taxpayers and a nearby municipality ap-
pealed to the board in order to prevent the quarrying operation on the
leased (but unused) land. 16
San Antonio's code definition of a preexisting use is more liberal than
other cities because it allows an "intended" use to obtain nonconforming
rights.1 7 The court of appeals held that nonconforming use status should
not apply merely by the act of leasing. The Texas Supreme Court agreed
with the board that the ordinance defined "use" in such a way that it
dealt with planned development, proposed use, or proposed occupancy as
exemplified by the quarrying lease executed in this case. In interpreting
the City's zoning ordinance, the court applied various canons of construc-
tion, but did not express any deference to the City's interpretation of its
own ordinance. While other cases have found that actual use is required
in order to have a nonconforming use, the language of the City's ordi-
nance is broader and encompasses planned uses. Having made a policy
decision to expand the definition, the City's interpretation was found to
be consistent with the remaining provisions of the ordinance. Because
the property was clearly leased and intended for the use, Martin Marietta
met the test in San Antonio's zoning ordinance.18
Another opinion addressing nonconforming uses can be found in
Pearce v. City of Round Rock.19 Pearce obtained permits from the Texas
Department of Transportation to erect nine billboards in the City's extra-
territorial jurisdiction ("ETJ"). After construction began on some of the
structures, the Round Rock City Council adopted an ordinance extending
the City's authority to regulate billboards in the ETJ. The City's building
12. Swain v. Bd. of Adjustment of Univ. Park, 433 S.W.2d 727, 730 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
13. Bd. of Adjustment of San Antonio v. Wende, 92 S.W.3d 424 (Tex. 2002).
14. Id. at 427.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 426.
17. Id. at 429.
18. Id. at 430-32.




official then ordered Pearce to stop construction. 20
Two of the signs were then treated as nonconforming uses while the
remaining seven were treated as requiring a City permit. The Develop-
ment Review Board (similar to a board of adjustment) upheld all of the
official's decisions and plaintiffs sought judicial review. 21 The key issue in
this case was whether any of the seven structures qualified as noncon-
forming uses at the time the City enacted its ETJ sign ordinance. Pearce
contended that (i) all of the signs were nonconforming structures; (ii) the
structures were signs; and (iii) they were entitled to be "grandfathered. ' '22
The board upheld the building official, and Pearce filed suit in district
court, which upheld the board. The Austin Court of Appeals held that
the board's decision was not supported by the legal definition of "sign"
contained in the sign ordinance. The City official determined that a sign
only attains nonconforming status if it contains third-party advertising
prior to the effective date. Because the language of the sign ordinance
did not contain this requirement, signs were construed to be any struc-
tures with symbols or words. Those structures that did not have a con-
structed surface face upon which symbols could be attached were held
not to be signs. 23
The court of appeals held that the City's ordinance prohibiting Pearce
from utilizing the three structures that contained no writing or symbols
was constitutional. Because the record did not contain any evidence of
the economic impact of the regulation on Pearce, the court of appeals
held that Pearce did not meet its burden to support its takings claim.24
Boards of adjustment also rule on requests for variances or special ex-
ceptions to a city's zoning ordinance. Fincher v. Board of Adjustment of
Hunters Creek Village25 illustrates the need to file a variance request in a
timely manner. The City rejected a homebuilder's plans, in 1995, for a
covered porch or carport as a violation of the City's zoning ordinance.
Approximately one year later, the building official discovered the
Finchers were proceeding with construction and ordered them to halt.
The Finchers applied to the board of adjustment for a variance. 26
Hunters Creek's zoning ordinance provides that an appeal to the board
of adjustment must be made within thirty days after the decision of the
building official. The trial court held that the Finchers should have ap-
pealed the building official's April 1995 rejection of their building plans.
The trial court dismissed on the ground that it did not have subject matter
jurisdiction. While the Houston Court of Appeals held that the court did
20. Id. at 645.
21. Id. In the initial litigation, the trial court dismissed the suit for want of jurisdiction
but was reversed on appeal. See Pearce v. City of Round Rock, 992 S.W.2d 668 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1999, pet. denied).
22. Pearce, 78 S.W.3d at 645.
23. Id. at 649-50.
24. Id. at 650-51.
25. Fincher v. Bd. of Adjustment of Hunters Creek Vill., 56 S.W.3d 815 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
26. Id. at 816.
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have jurisdiction, it reached the same result as the trial court on the mer-
its and rendered judgment against the Finchers. 2 7
Town of South Padre Island v. Cantu28 addresses a different type of fact
situation where the homeowner proceeds in good faith. The Cantus pre-
pared plans for their new house, which were approved by the Town.
When the house was almost completed, the Cantus discovered that a por-
tion of the bedroom over the garage protruded twenty-two inches over
the building setback line. The Cantus requested a variance for the pro-
trusion, and the Cantus' neighbors supported the request at the board
hearing. A majority of the adjustment board voted to approve the
Cantu's variance request, but it did not pass by the required 75% major-
ity of the board's membership. 29
The trial court found the board abused its discretion by not granting
the variance. While the general rule is that a trial court may not substi-
tute its judgment for the board's, if a hardship exists and the exception
would not adversely affect the public interest, then the request should be
granted. The court pointed out that the Cantus had spent tens of
thousands of dollars building their house in good faith reliance on the
City approvals and denying the variance request would benefit no one.
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals upheld the trial court, holding that
a hardship existed and the variance did not adversely affect the public
interest. 30
III. SUBDIVISION REGULATIONS
State statute regulates subdivision of land for development. 3' City of
Hedwig Village Planning and Zoning Commission v. Howeth Investments,
Inc.32 addressed the issue of whether a potential purchaser of property
has standing to file a plat application for subdivision of property instead
of the property owner In Hedwig Village, the developer had two adja-
cent tracts of land under contract from two separate owners. Both con-
tracts allowed the developer to apply to the Planning Commission, on
behalf of the owners, to subdivide each tract. Following the filing of the
applications with the Commission, the Commission met and discussed the
applications, but took no action.33
After thirty days lapsed, the developer, pursuant to Texas Local Gov-
ernment Code § 212.009(a), requested two "Certificates of No Action
Taken" from the chairman of the Commission. The Texas Local Govern-
ment Code provides that "the municipal authority responsible for ap-
27. Id. at 817.
28. Town of S. Padre Island v. Cantu, 52 S.W.3d 287 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001,
no pet.).
29. Id. at 288-89; TEX. Loc. Gov'T. CODE ANN. § 211.009(c) (Vernon 1999).
30. Cantu, 52 S.W.3d at 289-91.
31. TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. §§ 213.001-.005 (Vernon 2001).
32. City of Hedwig Vill. Planning & Zoning Comm. v. Howeth Invs., Inc., 73 S.W.3d
389 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist] 2002, no pet.).
33. Id. at 390.
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proving plats shall act on a plat within 30 days after the date the plat is
filed."'34 Further, "[a] plat is considered approved by the municipal au-
thority unless it is disapproved within that period.35 The chairman of the
Commission refused to issue the Certificates. Following a second hearing
concerning the plat applications, the Commission denied both of the re-
quested subdivisions. The developer then submitted a second set of plats
to the Commission that were also denied. The developer subsequently
sued seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the chairman to issue the
previously requested "Certificates of No Action Taken." 36
The Commission filed a plea to the jurisdiction of the trial court argu-
ing that the developer did not have standing to bring suit because the
developer did not own either of the two tracts at the time the plat appli-
cations were denied by the Commission. The trial court denied the Com-
mission's plea. The Houston Court of Appeals conceded that Texas
Local Government Code, § 212.004(a) "requires ownership to actually
subdivide property. '37 However, the court clarified that "[Texas Local
Government Code § 212.004(a)] does not require ownership to file an
application to subdivide. It is logical that a developer's decision to
purchase property would be contingent on the approval of his plans to
subdivide the property. ' 38 Thus, the court held that the developer had
standing to bring suit and that the property owner is not the only person
with standing to file a plat application and remanded the case to the trial
court.
3 9
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals in Brunson v. Woolsey40 addressed a
similar issue (with a different result). The Woolseys, who owned a single
lot within the Oakwood Estates subdivision, began efforts to subdivide
and revise the plat of their lot. The developer of the subdivision had
signed the original approved plat. Following a public hearing before the
Parker County Commissioners Court regarding the proposed plat revi-
sion, the commissioners voted to deny the revised plat. Woolsey subse-
quently filed suit against various county officials ("Brunson"), seeking
declaratory relief from the court that Woolsey's plat revision complied
with the requirements contained in the Texas Local Government Code.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Woolseys. 41
Brunson argued on appeal that § 232.009 of the Local Government
Code established two exclusive categories of people: "[a] person who has
subdivided land" and "non-developer owners."'42 Because Woolsey was a
"non-developer owner," he lacked standing to proceed under the
34. TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 212.009(a) (Vernon 1999).
35. Id.
36. Hedwig Vi!., 73 S.W.3d at 390-91.
37. Id. at 393.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 393-94.
40. Brunson v. Woolsey, 63 S.W.3d 583 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.).
41. Id. at 585.
42. Id. at 589.
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statute.43
In analyzing § 232.009(b), the court compared and contrasted the lan-
guage contained in Texas Local Government Code § 232.008(b), pertain-
ing to the cancellation of subdivisions. Interpreting § 232.008(b), the
court stated that "[c]learly, this section authorizes an owner of land in a
subdivision who is not the original developer to submit an application for
the cancellation of the subdivision."44 The court concluded that the legis-
lature could have defined those authorized to seek a revision of a subdivi-
sion as it did those persons eligible to seek the cancellation of all or part
of a subdivision, but did not.45 In distinguishing the two provisions, the
court additionally relied on the fact that both § 232.008 and § 232.009
were enacted in the same legislative session. The court further construed
the phrase "has subdivided," contained in § 232.009(b), as referring to
what the court termed the "developer owner" in preparing the original
plat.46 Therefore, the court held that because Woolsey was not the origi-
nal developer that filed the subdivision plat, Woolsey lacked standing
pursuant to § 232.009(b) to file suit seeking declaratory judgment to re-
vise the plat.47
In Miller v. Elliot,48 the court addressed the requirements for a dedica-
tion of streets in a subdivision. The property at issue in this case was
previously part of a larger tract that was platted as a subdivision by the
Commissioners' Court of Van Zandt County and Canton County. Actual
development of the subdivision was never pursued and the property was
sold to the Millers ("Miller Property"). Elliot owned the adjacent tract
("Elliot Property"). The Wilsons began to prepare the Elliot Property as
a future home site and constructed a driveway across the Elliot Property,
connecting it to an adjacent road. In a neighborly fashion, the Wilsons
installed a gate, placed locks on the gate, posted "no trespassing" signs
and made demands to the Millers that the Millers not use the Wilson's
driveway. The Millers filed suit seeking to enjoin the Wilsons from re-
stricting their use of the Wilson's driveway, claiming they were entitled to
use of the driveway by virtue of an implied easement and dedication by
plat. Elliot filed with the trial court a no-evidence summary judgment
with the trial court, which was granted. 49
The Tyler Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the Millers
failed to present any evidence to support their claim of the existence of
an implied easement. Next, the court addressed the Millers' allegation
that they were entitled to the use of the Wilson's driveway based on the
previous owners' filing of a subdivision plat in 1971, which contained a
notation that all streets and easements shown thereon are dedicated to
43. Id. at 590.
44. Id. at 589 n.31.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 590.
48. Miller v. Elliot, 94 S.W.3d 38 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2002, pet. denied).




The court noted that in order to prove a dedication of a subdivision,
"the Millers are required to show that the land in question was, in fact,
both dedicated and accepted."'5' Further, the "[d]edication is a mere of-
fer and the filing does not constitute an acceptance of the dedication.
52
The Millers presented the court with an affidavit that stated that the
previous owner of the property allowed access to the roads. The court
pointed out, however, that the affidavit made no mention as to the length
of time, if any, the Millers, or any other member of the public, could
actually make use of the roads. Thus, the court found that the Millers
presented no evidence to support their claim that there was acceptance
by public use and upheld the trial court.
IV. PHYSICAL TAKINGS
In City of Austin v. Travis County Landfill Company, L.L.C.,53 the
court considered the constitutional standard necessary to establish a "tak-
ing" of private property by aircraft overflights under the Texas Constitu-
tion. The landfill property was previously subject to a military overflight
easement. The United States' transfer of ownership and operation of
Bergstom Airport to the City of Austin extinguished the military over-
flight easement. A jury held there was a taking and awarded the landfill
company $2,950,000 in damages. 54
According to the United States Supreme Court, flights over private
land must be so low and frequent as to constitute a direct interference
with the use and enjoyment of the property. 55 The fact that civilian air-
craft overflew the landfill site, without more, did not establish an inverse
condemnation. Both parties' experts testified that the value of the prop-
erty decreased. Unfortunately for the landfill operator, the record did
not show that "overflight-related effects directly impacted the property's
surface and caused the property's value to decline."'56 The landfill opera-
tor's expert appraiser failed to show that the civilian overflights, separate
and apart from the burdens imposed by the military aviation easement,
"substantially increased risks and costs associated with the property's use
as a landfill."'57 The court rejected the owner's claim that it had a right to
exclude civilian overflights as a matter of common law property rights.
Thus, the trial court's conclusion relating to direct interference with the
plaintiff's property right, based in part on the invasion of airspace, could
also be ignored. Proof of a decline in property values, by itself, does not
justify a finding of direct interference. There was no evidence that the
50. Id. at 44.
51. Id. at 45.
52. Id.
53. City of Austin v. Travis County Landfill Co., 73 S.W.3d 234 (Tex. 2002).
54. Id. at 237-38.
55. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946).
56. Id. at 242.
57. Id. at 243.
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overflights through vibrations, noise, physical damage, or fumes caused
the alleged decline in the value of the surface estate. The evidence, ac-
cording to the Texas Supreme Court, also failed to show that the over-
flights would cause any interference with the ability of the owner to use
the premises for landfill purposes. Instead of remanding for a new trial,
the court rendered judgment that the plaintiff take nothing under its in-
verse condemnation claim.58
In City of Keller v. Wilson,59 the court of appeals examined whether a
city could be held liable for inverse condemnation and whether develop-
ers of adjacent property and/or a city could be held liable for water code
violations resulting from the platting and construction of a new develop-
ment. Wilson was the owner of property located in Keller ("Wilson Prop-
erty"). In 1991, the City of Keller adopted a Master Drainage Plan that
required developers to provide for removal of run-off water resulting
from a 100-year rain event. Prior to development in the area, the natural
flow of surface water generally was from north to south towards the Wil-
son Property through a creek or ditch and continuing into an adjacent
creek watershed. The drainage plan called for a drainage easement
across the Wilson Property as the surrounding properties developed. 60
The city reversed and approved plats for two new subdivisions to the
northwest of the Wilson Property. As a condition of approving the plats,
the City required the developers to build drainage improvements ending
at the edge of the Wilson Property. As a result of the construction of the
drainage improvements required by the City, the volume and velocity of
water flowing across the Wilson Property increased, causing damage to
the property.61
Wilson brought multiple claims against the City and the developers,
including allegations of inverse condemnation of the Wilson Property by
the City and violations of the water code by the developers and the City.
Following jury findings in favor of Wilson on both claims against the City,
Wilson elected to recover on his inverse condemnation claim and the trial
court entered judgment for Wilson on that theory. As for Wilson's claims
against the developers, the trial court granted summary judgments in
favor of the two developers. Both the City and Wilson appealed. 62
The City first argued to the Fort Worth Court of Appeals that it never
intended to damage the Wilson Property; and therefore, could not be
found liable under an inverse condemnation claim.63 The City further
contested that it "endeavored in every way possible to avoid increasing
the flow of water" by hiring an independent engineering firm to review
the developer's design for the drainage easement. 64 Finally, the City
58. Id. at 242-44.
59. City of Keller v. Wilson, 86 S.W.3d 693, (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, pet. filed).
60. Id. at 698.
61. Id.
62. Id.




complained that it should not be held liable for inverse condemnation
simply "because it approved the developer's design for the drainage
easement. 6
5
The Court began its review of the City's claim that Wilson failed to
prove intent on the part of the City, stating, ". . . an inverse condemnation
plaintiff must prove more than just negligence. An invasion is considered
intentional, rather than negligent, when the State acts for the purpose of
causing the invasion or knows that it is substantially certain to result from
its conduct. '66 In reviewing the evidence presented at trial, the court
noted that the drainage plan required the construction of an earthen
channel running across a portion of the property as well as the construc-
tion of an earthen channel across approximately 2.8 acres of the Wilson
Property.67
The testimony at trial "established that, at the platting stage, the City
required the two developers to purchase an easement on the City's behalf
... and to construct the earthen channel. ' 68 In addition, the City con-
structed a box culvert immediately to the south of the Wilson Property
that the Drainage Plan also required. Thus, Wilson presented evidence
that the City required the completion of the upper portion of the Drain-
age Plan by the developers and completed the lower portion of the
Drainage Plan itself, but left uncompleted the portion of the Drainage
Plan that provided for drainage across the Wilson Property. Wilson fur-
ther presented a hydrological engineering study showing increased flow,
as well as photos of the previously-channeled water flowing uncontrolla-
bly over the Wilson Property. 69 The City's Director of Public Works tes-
tified "that the City was bound by the Drainage Plan and that there were
no exceptions to it."' 70
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals noted that "[i]ntent may be inferred
from the circumstances of the case and the conduct of the actor, not just
the overt expression of intent by the actor .... [T]riers of fact are free to
discredit defendants' protestations that no harm was intended and to
draw inferences necessary to establish intent."' 7' The Court then found
that, based on the record,
the jury could have reasonably inferred that the City intentionally
disregarded its own [Drainage] Plan requirement that an easement
and large earthen drainage channel be created across the Wilson
Property and that the City knew flooding of the Wilson Property was
substantially certain to result from the City's decision to leave the
portion of the Drainage Plan concerning the Wilson Property
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 702.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 703.
70. Id. at 704.
71. Id.
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uncompleted. 72
The court clarified that the "City's liability for inverse condemnation was
not based on any flaw in the developer's design or construction of the
detention basin or Sebastian easement, but instead on the City's own in-
tentional choice to leave uncompleted portion of its Plan addressing
drainage across the Wilson Property. ' 73 The court concluded that be-
cause the City was directly involved in the drainage plans of the two de-
velopments and required compliance with the Drainage Plan, it was the
City that caused the flooding of the Wilson Property and not the develop-
ers who only did as they were instructed. 74 The Texas Supreme Court
granted the City's petition for review in this case.
Howard v. City of Kerrville75 addressed another flooding case. The San
Antonio Court of Appeals examined a landowner's "taking by flooding"
inverse condemnation claim, determining whether the landowner's claim
was ripe for consideration by the court. Howard purchased property, in
1989, that was subject to a permanent flood easement, established in
1977, across approximately 6.03 acres of the property to construct a dam
on the Guadalupe River by Upper Guadalupe River Authority
("UGRA"). Howard's predecessor in title was required to fill the prop-
erty to 1641.5 feet mean sea level in order to build on the property. The
dam was built and subsequently destroyed by a flood. In 1985, the dam
was rebuilt in the same place, using the same general specifications as the
original dam. That same year, Howard's predecessor in title obtained ap-
proval for a subdivision plat. The plat showed the contours of the perma-
nent flood easement and further contained the express condition that any
floodway fill or development required prior certification by an engineer
and approval by the City and UGRA.76
In 1989, the City and UGRA discovered that the earlier "FEMA flood
plain maps did not account for the impact that the original dam had on
the flood plain."' 77 A study commissioned by the City revealed that the
dam had increased the existing flood plain to 1646 feet mean sea level,
five feet higher than Howard's property had been filled. Around this
same time, Howard submitted an application for a permit to build a shop-
ping center on the property. After Howard's application was placed on
the City Council's agenda, the City passed a moratorium on all land de-
velopment believed to be located in the expanded floodplain identified in
the study. The moratorium lasted approximately seven months and How-
ard's permit was denied pending the outcome of the FEMA floodplain
map revisions. 78
72. Id. at 705.
73. Id. at 707.
74. Id. at 715.
75. Howard v. City of Kerrville, 75 S.W.3d 112 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, pet.
denied).
76. Id. at 114-15.




Another later study indicated that the base flood elevation of How-
ard's property was 1648 feet mean sea level, 7.5 feet higher than the prop-
erty had been previously filled. The City then expanded the scope of the
moratorium to the new base flood elevation line. In 1997, based on the
City's studies, FEMA published new findings concerning the base flood
elevations, determining that the base flood level for Howard's property
was 1648.5 feet mean sea level. This required Howard to fill his property
to 1649.5 feet mean sea level, eight feet higher than previously filled. Fol-
lowing the City's adoption of the new regulations, Howard did not re-
quest a reconsideration of his original application. Instead, Howard later
applied for a permit to build a used car dealership. Before City Council
consideration, Howard withdrew the application. Later that year, How-
ard filed suit against the City and UGRA, alleging inverse condemnation,
trespass, and breach of contract (claiming to be a third-party beneficiary).
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City and
UGRA.79
On appeal, Howard claimed that the dam constructed by the City and
UGRA, in 1984, (which increased the base flood elevation on his eleva-
tion by six feet), coupled with the City's ordinances regulating the flood-
plain, created an easement for public use and amounted to a physical
taking of Howard's property. In reviewing Howard's claims, the court
emphasized that a "'taking' by flooding is a specific type of taking.80 Cit-
ing the Texas Supreme Court's holding in Brazos River Authority v. City
of Graham, the court of appeals noted that in order to establish a taking
by flood, "a claimant must show that the flooding occurred repeatedly or
continuously." 81 Because Howard failed to present any evidence that the
property was "actually inundated with flood water due to the dam," the
court agreed with the trial court that summary judgment was appropriate
in favor of the City and UGRA on this issue.
Howard additionally claimed that the City's ordinances caused a partial
taking because the regulations dramatically reduced Howard's invest-
ment-backed expectations. The court of appeals initially set forth that
"before a court can determine whether such a taking occurred, the claim
must be ripe for judicial review."'82 The court of appeals focused on the
fact that Howard only applied for a permit under the pre-1994 City regu-
lations and that the moratorium was imposed on development prior to
any action on the permit by the City. Once the permit was lifted, Howard
abandoned the application. While Howard later submitted an application
for a used car dealership, he again withdrew the application prior to any
City action on the permit request. Therefore, the court found that How-
ard failed to establish a ripe claim. Had the City actually denied How-
ard's applications, Howard's claims would have been ripe for
79. Id. at 115-16.
80. Id. at 117.
81. Id. (citing Brazos River Auth. v. City of Graham, 354 S.W.2d 99, 107 (Tex. 1961)).
82. Id. at 118.
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consideration by the court. The trial court's ruling was upheld.83
V. SUBDIVISION EXACTIONS
In Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates,84 the Fort Worth Court
of Appeals explored application of the takings analysis to non-physical
exactions. In Stafford Estates, the Town's ordinances required developers
to upgrade existing boundary streets to current standards. Upon filing
for a final plat for the second phase, the City required reconstruction of a
boundary street. On stipulated facts, the trial court held that a takings
had occurred and awarded damages, attorneys fees and costs. 85
The court first noted that Texas does not have statutes that require pre-
approval challenges to platting, but does articulate deadlines for chal-
lenges regarding board of adjustment decisions, impact fees, and the
"takings statute." Absent such restriction for plat approval, and noting
the developers consistent objections, the court held that the developer
did not waive its rights by waiting until after finishing the project to file
suit.86
After acknowledging development exactions as a species of regulatory
takings, the court recited the two prongs of the Dolan test: (1) does an
essential nexus exist between a legitimate state interest and the condition
exacted, and (2) was the exaction roughly proportional to the proposed
impact of the proposed land use. 87 The City's first challenge to the lower
court decision was that the Dolan analysis should not be applied to exac-
tions that do not involve dedication of real property. Because both
nondedicatory exactions and required dedications involve "conditional
governmental leveraging," the court held that the same constitutional test
applied to both.88
The second challenge by the City asserted that the Dolan test did not
apply since the ordinances in question were legislatively created, and
were not an adjudicative action. Without passing upon whether Dolan
might apply to legislative exactions, the court held that the Town's re-
quirement to construct the roadway was the result of adjudicative deci-
sions. Because the Town exercised its discretion in denying the requested
exceptions to the standards and admitted that other developers have
been excepted on a case-by-case basis, the exactions were adjudicative in
nature.89
Finally, observing that the United States Constitution sets the floor for
constitutional protections and the Texas Constitution establishes the ceil-
ing, the court held that the Dolan analysis does apply in a Texas constitu-
83. Id.
84. Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd., 71 S.W.3d 18 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2002, pet. granted).
85. Id. at 25-26.
86. Id. at 28-29.
87. Id. at 30.
88. Id. at 33.
89. Id. at 34-35.
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tional takings claim. The court found that protecting the public from the
dangers of increased traffic was a legitimate state interest that had a
nexus with the improvement of the subject roadway. Thus, the first prong
of the Dolan test was established. 90
In reviewing the second prong, the court held that while the City was
not required to make a pre-development determination of rough propor-
tionality, it failed to do so at trial. The developer showed that the subdi-
vision would account for only 18% of the traffic trips on the improved
road. The court also rejected the notion that the difference between the
maximum and actual impact fees collected could justify the exaction,
since the subject roadway was not on the capital improvement plan. The
court held that the City's requirement to replace the roadway was not
roughly proportional with traffic increases caused by the subdivision. 91
The court upheld the award of damages equal to approximately 88% of
the cost of the improvements, finding that it reflected the amount paid by
the developer in excess of any amount roughly proportional to the impact
of the subdivision and took into account any special benefit accrued to
the subdivision as a result of the improved roadway. The court overruled
the award of attorney's fees and expert fees, noting that the federal
claims were not ripe, and the takings award was pursuant to the Texas
constitutional remedy.92 Oral arguments were made before the Texas Su-
preme Court in this case on March 6, 2002.
VI. DOWNZONING CASES
In a case of first impression, the court of appeals held in City of Glenn
Heights v. Sheffield Development Co.93 that a city could be required to
pay for the downzoning of a developer's tract of land. Sheffield sued in
inverse condemnation on the ground that the downzoning deprived him
of his investment-backed expectations. The trial court ruled in Sheffield's
favor, and a jury awarded $485,000 in damages. 94
In 1986, the City first enacted a zoning ordinance applicable to Shef-
field's later-purchased 194-acre tract. The district was a PD residential
district allowing development on lots of 6500 square feet. A 43-acre por-
tion of the tract was developed pursuant to the concept site plan. In 1995,
the City adopted a unified development code but did not change the zon-
ing classification for the tract. The PD zoning was consistent with the
City's comprehensive plan. 95
In the Summer of 1996, Sheffield entered into a contract to purchase
the subject property and certain unbuilt lots. Sheffield actively conducted
90. Id. at 39-40.
91. Id. at 41-43.
92. Id. at 46, 51.
93. City of Glenn Heights v. Sheffield Dev. Co., 61 S.W.3d 634 (Tex. App.-Waco
2001, pet. granted).
94. Id. at 640.
95. Id. at 639-40.
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a due diligence investigation of the zoning on the property as well as the
possibility of it being rezoned. Sheffield had numerous meetings with the
City secretary, City manager, mayor, and various council members during
the Fall of 1996, to confirm his development rights. The sales contract
was closed in two stages with the final closing occurring on December 13,
1996. Approximately two weeks after the closing, the City (without noti-
fying Sheffield) imposed a thirty day moratorium preventing Sheffield
from developing the Property. 96
At its April 21, 1997, meeting, the City Council refused to vote on the
zoning and enacted a resolution to extend the moratorium. Not until
April 27, 1998, did the City Council vote on the zoning of the Property.
At that meeting, no written materials justifying a downzoning were
presented. The City Council voted to downzone the property from mini-
mum 6,500 square foot lots to minimum 12,000 square foot lots. Sheffield
filed suit for an inverse condemnation.97
In a bifurcated trial, the trial court determined that the downzoning,
but not the moratorium, constituted a regulatory taking and awarded
monetary damages based on the diminution in property value before and
after the downzoning. The jury found that the parcel had been dimin-
ished in value by some 50% from $970,000 to $485,000, while the City
urged that the downzoning at most diminished the value by only 38%.98
The initial issue for the court of appeals was whether there are any
differences between regulatory taking analysis under state or federal con-
stitutional principles. Sheffield's claims were based on state constitu-
tional grounds alone. While the Texas just compensation clause contains
the additional protections relating to the damage or destruction of prop-
erty, the court held that it should review the case under both Texas and
federal law standards. 99
On appeal to the Waco Court of Appeals, the City contested the deter-
mination that there was a taking of Sheffield's property. The Waco Court
of Appeals held that, although the downzoning substantially advanced
legitimate governmental interests, it unreasonably interfered with Shef-
field's property rights. The court noted that less density was Glenn
Heights' method to reduce the effects of urbanization and control the
rate and character of growth and found that this was a legitimate govern-
mental interest. However, the court noted that even though the
downzoning advanced a legitimate governmental interest, a further deter-
mination of whether the downzoning unreasonably interfered with Shef-
field's right to use and enjoy the property under the "unreasonable
interference" test was necessary.100
Here, the court found there was a taking based on the Texas Supreme
96. Id. at 640.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 641.
99. Id. at 643-44. The court relies on Fort Worth & Rio Grande Ry. Co. v. Jennings, 13
S.W. 270 (1890), for support of potentially greater state protection.
100. Sheffield, 61 S.W.3d at 646-47.
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Court's holding in Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale. 01 There, the court
held that government has unreasonably interfered with the landowner's
right to use and enjoy property based on a consideration of two factors:
(1) the economic impact of the regulation; and (2) the extent to which the
regulation interferes with distinct investment-back expectations. 02
"The first factor, the economic impact of the regulation, merely com-
pares the value that has been taken from the property with the value that
remains in the property."' 0 3 Sheffield put on evidence that the downzon-
ing had a severe economic impact on the value of the property, decreas-
ing the value of the property over 90%. The city presented evidence that
the downzoning decreased the value of the property 38%. The court of
appeals held that the undisputed evidence of at least a 38% decline in
value of the property as a direct result of the downzoning satisfied, as a
matter of law, the first factor of the unreasonable interference test.10 4
The City criticized the court of appeals' holding that the 38% diminu-
tion in market value due to the downzoning was not significant enough to
constitute a taking. Mayhew simply requires the consideration of two ele-
ments in the unreasonable interference test: the economic impact of the
regulation and the extent to which the regulation interferes with invest-
ment-backed expectations.1 115 The opinion does not establish any per se
yardsticks with respect to the two elements because there is no "set
formula" for determining when "justice and fairness" result in a regula-
tory takings finding. 10 6
The second factor involves the investment-backed expectations of
the owner. The existing and permitted uses of the property consti-
tute the "primary expectation" of the owner that is affected by regu-
lation. The existing uses permitted by law are what shape the
owner's reasonable expectation. Courts have traditionally looked to
existing uses of property as a basis for determining the extent of in-
terference with the owner's "primary expectation concerning the
parcel." 10 7
Because the Mayhews were ranchers and purchased land with agricul-
tural or large lot zoning districts, the Texas Supreme Court held that they
did not have reasonable investment-backed expectations to obtain an
upzoning to triple the residential density on their property. Sheffield, on
the other hand, was an experienced real estate developer who (according
to the trial court's finding of fact) reasonably relied on city ordinances,
historical zoning in Glenn Heights and official representations that it
could develop in accordance with the PD 10 zoning.' 08
101. Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. 1998).
102. Id. at 935.
103. Sheffield, 61 S.W.3d at 648.
104. Id.
105. Mayhew, 964 S.W.2d at 935.
106. Palazolla v. R.I., 533 U.S. 603, 633 (2001).
107. Sheffield, 61 S.W.3d at 648 (internal citations omitted).
108. Id. at 652.
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The trial court found that the City's moratorium was constitutional.
The court of appeals, however, held that the moratorium beyond the ini-
tial three-month period did not substantially advance a legitimate govern-
mental purpose. Because the extension deprived Sheffield of his
constitutional rights, the court of appeals reversed on the moratorium is-
sue and remanded for a determination of damages.10 9
Sheffield involved the deprivation of a previously established develop-
ment right. If the use has not already been authorized, then the land-
owner's investment-backed expectations cannot be deprived according to
Hallco Texas, Inc. v. McMullen County.110 Hallco informed the County
of its proposed plans to use its 128-acre tract that was located near a
reservoir as a nonhazardous industrial waste disposal site. Hallco applied
for a disposal permit from the Texas Natural Resource Conservation
Commission ("TNRCC"). 1 1'
Immediately after the TNRCC approved a draft permit for Hallco, the
County passed an ordinance prohibiting disposal of solid waste in the
County within three miles of a reservoir. By that time, Hallco had in-
vested $800,000 in the site and permit process. Hallco filed an as-applied
takings claim against the County, reserving its federal takings claim for
presentation in federal court. The trial court granted summary judgment
in favor of the County on the inverse condemnation issue.' 12
In support of its claim, Hallco argued that it had spent significant sums
in its attempt to obtain the permit, and the County had unreasonably
interfered with its vested right to develop a waste disposal site that ex-
isted at the inception of its title. In ruling in favor of the County, the
court of appeals pointed out that Hallco sought but had not received the
final TNRCC permit. The court held that, without an approved permit,
Hallco did not have a distinct investment-backed expectation that it could
use the property for solid waste disposal, and the use of the property for
that purpose was not allowed. For those reasons, the County prevailed
on its summary judgment motion.11 3
The Houston Court of Appeals also addressed this concept in Maguire
Oil Company v. City of Houston,'14 where the City revoked a permit au-
thorizing Maguire to drill a gas well near Lake Houston, a freshwater
reservoir and the City's main source of drinking water. Relying on the
issued permit, Maguire prepared the land for drilling, purchased nearby
leases, and began moving equipment into the drilling site. The City then
issued a stop work order, claiming that the permit had been issued in
109. Id. at 658.
110. Hallco Tex., Inc. v. McMullen County, 94 S.W.3d 735 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2000, pet. filed).
111. Id. at 736-37.
112. Id. at 737.
113. Id. at 738.





Elements of investment-backed expectations, such as the existing uses
and zoning of property, the plaintiff's reasons for purchasing the prop-
erty, and municipal permit approvals pursuant to the zoning are similar to
the elements of promissory or equitable estoppel. As stated in Maguire,
these elements include (1) a promise; (2) foreseeability of reliance by the
promissor; and (3) substantial reliance by the promissee to his detriment
constitute these elements.' 16 In Maguire, the drilling permits were held
to constitute a promise that Maguire could commence drilling operations.
Furthermore, the substantial monetary expenditures spent in reliance
upon the issuance of the permits were held to be reasonable.' 1 7
While Maguire Oil focuses primarily on the equitable estoppel issue,
there is also a discussion about Maguire's investment-backed expecta-
tions claim. In a motion for summary judgment, the City contended that
there was no evidence Maguire suffered economic loss or damage as a
result of its permit revocation.118 Maguire's expert witnesses, utilizing a
geological report and a discounted cash flow analysis, argued that the
market value of the untapped natural gas reserves exceeded
$33,586,000.00. The City sought to exclude this testimony "because it was
not based on an estimate of the market value of what was taken, i.e. the
right to drill for gas, and speculative because it presumed minerals were
present" and could be exploited." 9 The court of appeals acknowledged
that valuation techniques other than the comparable sales methodology
can be utilized if comparable sales are unavailable. 120 The court, there-
fore, held that summary judgment was inappropriate on Maguire's in-
verse condemnation claim and the investment-backed expectations
matter should be remanded to the trial court.12'
Champion Builders v. City of Terrell Hills 22 addressed the issue of
proximate cause in inverse condemnation cases The City's board of ad-
justment revoked Champion's building permit for a multi-family project
in 1994. Litigation was filed and Champion's building permit was rein-
stated. 23 However, Champion never asked the City to reissue the per-
mit, and subsequently the City increased the minimum square foot
requirements for apartment units from 800 square feet to 1200 square
feet.' 24 Champion filed a takings suit which went to the jury. Despite the
findings by the jury that the City's actions constituted an inverse condem-
115. Id. at 356.
116. Id. at 369.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 361.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 363.
121. Id. at 372.
122. Champion Builders v. City of Terrell Hills, 70 S.W.3d 221 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 2002, pet. granted).
123. Id. at 225.
124. Id. at 225-26.
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nation, the trial court entered a take nothing judgment.125
The court of appeals, however, rejected the plaintiffs claim that the
permit revocation constituted a regulatory taking. The court took the
Mayhew approach of examining the economic impact of the regulation
and the interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations. 126
Most regulatory takings claims involve the restriction on the use of land
imposed by a zoning ordinance, not the denial of a single permit. The
fact that the permit denial, even if wrongful, led to a chain of events caus-
ing the project to fail does not constitute an inverse condemnation claim.
The court buttressed its conclusion by noting that the trial court reversed
the board's permit revocation decision within two months, so whatever
collateral losses the plaintiffs incurred were not caused by the revocation
decision. 127
According to the court, the term "regulatory takings refers to situations
in which the government restricts the use of land. ' 12 8 The collateral im-
plications from the resulting legal dispute between the residents and
Champion did not constitute a regulatory taking by the City.129
Similarly, according to the court of appeals in Grunwald v. City of Cas-
tle Hills,130 the City's failure to act cannot constitute a regulatory taking.
The Grunwalds brought suit against the City and Casa Norte del Sol,
Ltd., the owners of an office building located adjacent to their residential
property. The Grunwalds asked the court to declare the office building to
be in violation of the City's zoning regulations and to issue a mandatory
injunction compelling the City to enforce those regulations. The
Grunwalds also claimed the City's failure to act against Casa Norte
amounted to a regulatory taking. The City moved for summary judgment
on all of the Grunwald's claims and the trial court granted the motion. In
several issues on appeal, the Grunwalds argued that summary judgment
was erroneously granted because the City failed to establish as a matter
of law that the statute of limitations barred their claim under article 1,
section 17 of the Texas Constitution and the City failed to establish as a
matter of law that it did not commit a regulatory taking. The court held
that the City's failure to enforce its zoning ordinances, rather than taking
an affirmative action, cannot constitute a regulatory taking.
131
125. Id. at 226-27.
126. Id. at 231 (citing Mayhew, 964 S.W.2d at 933).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 232.
129. Id.
130. Grunwald v. City of Castle Hills, No. 04-02-00217-CV, 2002 WL 31753616 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio Dec. 11, 2002, no pet.).
131. Id. at *24.
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